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Abstract 
In  accordance  with  EU  regulations,  payment  levels  for  several  measures  of  rural 
development programs are calculated on the basis of standard cost approaches, using 
'typical’ or average figures for costs incurred and income forgone. Resulting uniform 
payment  rates  have  been  frequently  discussed  and  criticised  as  being  inefficient, 
having a low cost-effectiveness and generating excessive windfall profits. However, 
few  empirical  studies  exist  which  quantitatively  examine  potentials  of  a  more 
differentiated standard cost approach. By using German farm accountancy data, this 
study  analyses  effects  of  a  payment  differentiation  according  to  regional  and  farm 
individual  characteristics  on  producer  rents,  budget  expenditures  and  economic 
efficiency. Preliminary results show that though overcompensation could be reduced in 
most cases, savings in budget expenditure are often small and might be even offset by 
increasing administration costs. Generally our analysis indicates that potential benefits 
of differentiated standard cost approaches can be partly exploited if a) variances of the 
cost of participation in the universe of farms are high and the discriminatory natures of 
differentiation  are  significant,  and  b)  positive  correlations  between  costs  and 
environmental benefits are strong. 
Keywords: differentiated payment levels, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, standard cost 
approach, rural development schemes, agri-environmental measures 1.  Introduction 
In  accordance  with  EU  regulations,  payment  levels  for  several  measures  of  rural 
development programs are calculated on the basis of standard cost approaches, using 
'typical’ or average figures for costs incurred and income forgone. A recent EU report 
(European  Commission,  2005)  noted  that  resulting  uniform  payment  rates  contrast 
with the fact that many member states and regions have schemes covering a fairly 
large geographical area, and recommends that more work could usefully be done on 
the efficiency of measures. The related ongoing discussions about introducing more 
differentiated payment schemes in general focus on three different research directions. 
The first line of argument is favouring to pay farmers for the production of public 
goods  instead  of  compensating  them  for  participating  in  specific  extensification 
measures. Other authors concentrate on the analysis of auction schemes with farm 
individual  bids  as  an  alternative  to  fixed  payment  levels.  And  a  third  approach 
addresses the possibilities of improving the performance of standard cost approaches 
by  a  further  differentiation,  e.g.  small-scale  regional  or  even  individual  farm 
differentiation. Whereas the first two approaches have received extensive attention in 
research (see e.g. Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005, for a review of auction schemes 
in agri-environmental programmes), few empirical studies exist which quantitatively 
examine potentials of a more differentiated standard cost approach. Our paper resumes 
the discussions of more differentiated approaches to determining payment levels and 
analyses effects of a payment differentiation according to regional and farm individual 
characteristics  on  producer  rents,  budget  expenditures  and  economic  efficiency. 
Particularly, the study aims to go beyond other predominantly theoretical discussions 
on  payment  level  differentiation  by  quantitatively  analysing  the  benefits  of  more 
differentiated  standard  cost  approaches  for  selected  agri-environmental  measures 
(AEM) using farm accountancy data from Germany. The remainder of this paper is 
organised  as  follows:  first,  the  effect  of  flat-rate  payments  based  on  standard-cost 
approaches is illustrated, followed by a discussion of the motivations for differentiated 
approaches  and  the  subsequent  outline  of  an  evaluation  framework  and  related 
indicators. Then, a short overview of the data used for the numerical analyses is given. 
Chapter  4  provides  an  overview  of  the  main  results  as  well  as  the  outcome  of 
sensitivity analyses. The paper concludes with a summary of main findings and an 
outlook on future research questions. 
2.  Payment differentiation 
2.1  Conceptual framework 
Many of the rural development measures in the EU offer a fixed per-ha payment to 
farmers for the compliance with a predetermined set of management prescriptions. The 
determination  of  payment  levels  is  often  based  on  standardised  values  for  costs 
incurred by farmers from implementing the measures, which is explicitly endorsed in 
the  EU  regulation
1  for  many  rural  development  measures
2.  Figure 1  provides  a 
schematic  illustration  of  the  effects  of  related  simple  flat-rate  payments  and  more 
differentiated  schemes  on  uptake  and  expenditure.  Eligible  land  is  sorted  by  costs 
incurred by farmers when participating. In favour of simplicity, for the time being we 
                                                 
1 EC Reg 1974/2006, §53(1) Where appropriate Member States may fix the level of support [...] on the 
basis of standard costs and standard assumptions of income foregone. 
2 E.g., agri-environmental, Natura 2000, animal welfare and forestry measures. assume constant marginal benefits for each unit of land brought into the programme, 
and the curve of participation costs represents the ‘supply curve’ of the public good. 
Figure 1:  Schematic illustration of the effect of flat-rate vs. differentiated payments 
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The basic idea of differentiating payments is not to offer a single payment level to all 
potential participants, but rather to try to separate farms (into groups) by their costs of 
participation. In theory, differentiated payment levels can be significantly lower than a 
uniform flat-rate and still provide a financial incentive for participation to the same 
number of farms, thus reducing budget expenditure. 
Key issues for the analysis of payment differentiation are, firstly, the question of how 
to evaluate the performance of differentiated approaches, which is closely linked to the 
discussion of the objectives for differentiation, and secondly, the possibilities for an 
effective separation of farms into groups with different costs, or even approximation of 
individual costs, which is essentially an empirical question. 
2.2  Objectives of payment differentiation 
Payment  differentiation  is  not  an  objective  in  itself,  and  the  motivation  for 
differentiating payments depends crucially on the point of view of the decision maker 
and  the  related  underlying  decision  problem.  Three  main  objectives  for  payment 
differentiation can be identified (Table 1):  
·  For  policy  makers  at  EU  level,  coherency  with  the  general  framework  of 
agricultural policies and compliance to international treaties play an overarching 
role, which is reflected in the meticulous consideration of WTO concerns in the 
related EU legislation. Several paragraphs of the related legislation are targeted at 
fulfilling the Green Box requirements detailed in the Uruguay Round Agreement 
for  Agriculture,  Annex 2, § 12(b).  In  addition  to  almost  exactly  replicating  the 
wording  of  the  WTO  text
3,  further  specifications  of  procedures  for  payment 
calculations are made to warrant that these comply with the intended objectives 
and  purposes  of  the  WTO  text.  Considerable  effort  is  spent  on  detailing 
requirements for member states to ensure that payment calculations are based on 
objectives rather than political criteria, and that there is evidence and information 
on methodology, assumptions and parameters to allow the Commission to review 
                                                 
3 EC Reg 1698/2005, §39(4): The payments shall be granted annually and shall cover additional costs 
and income foregone resulting from the commitment made. consistency  and  plausibility  of  the  calculations  (EC  Reg  1974/2006,  §48(2), 
§53(2)). The rationality for payment differentiation thus lies in the attempt to limit 
the payments to actual participation costs and reduce overcompensation which may 
arise under flat-rate payment schemes and endanger WTO conformity. 
·  In the EU, it is the national or regional administration that is responsible for the 
design and implementation of concrete measures. On this level, in addition to the 
general framework for  payment calculations being exogenously set, agricultural 
administration often faces quasi-fixed budgets for specific policy areas, and the 
decision  problem  poses  itself  as  a  maximisation  of  programme  benefits  under 
budget constraints. Payment differentiation in this context is an option to increase 
budgetary efficiency.  
·  From a more general economic point of view, the comparison of different policies 
needs to take into account overall benefits and costs for society.
4 In applied welfare 
economics – the traditional economic cost-benefit analysis – the net contribution of 
a policy change to society’s welfare is analysed, regardless of distributional effects. 
The performance of payment differentiation is evaluated with respect to its impact 
on economic efficiency. 
Table 1:  Objectives for payment differentiation 
Main objective  Specific objective for 
payment differentiation 
Comply with WTO green box requirements  Reduce overcompensation 
Optimise programme benefits under budget 
restrictions  Increase budgetary efficiency 
Optimise Social Welfare  Increase economic efficiency 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1  Evaluation Framework 
Depending on the objective for payment differentiation, different sets of indicators 
suited for the comparison of different policies need to be identified. A key problem for 
the evaluation is that the performance of payment differentiation cannot be evaluated 
exclusively with regard to one of the three objectives identified above: Independent of 
the specific motivation for payment differentiation, in all cases the payments are made 
to  pursue  a  rural  development  objective,  e.g.  an  environmental  benefit,  and  an 
comparison of the effect of a policy change needs to take into account the impact on 
both aims, e.g. reduction of overcompensation and provision of environmental public 
goods. If, for example, a differentiated payment reduces social costs as well as societal 
benefits, the corresponding objectives need to be weighted, or, as is often the case in 
economic analysis, the societal benefits of farmers’ program participation need to be 
valued in monetary terms, which is notoriously difficult. As a solution to this problem, 
this study compares policies which are assumed to achieve the same result (i.e. same 
                                                 
4 This study takes the decision on the general type of policy instrument (i.e. payment for adopting 
certain management practices which affect provision of public goods) as given.  outcome  with  respect  to  the  rural  development  objective  of  the  specific  measure 
analysed). 
In  the  following  section,  firstly  individual  indicators  for  each  objective  will  be 
presented, before moving on to the discussion of a common framework which allows 
to take into account several objectives at the same time.  
3.1.1  Reduction of overcompensation 
In the context of rural development measures, overcompensation refers to situations in 
which some producers receive higher transfers than necessary to cover their costs of 
participation. The term ‘overcompensation’ is pejorative and in public discussion often 
seems to imply that ‘farmers get too much money’; other terms exist (Figure 2) which 
describe  the  same  phenomenon  but  have  a  very  different  connotation:  In  farm 
economics,  the  part  of  payments  exceeding  costs  is  part  of  the  profit,  or  farmers 
income, and seen as the remuneration of the farmers’ resources for the provision of a 
public  good.  This  point  of  view  is  quite  similar  to  the  understanding  of  the  more 
neutral term of ‘producer surplus’ used in welfare economics. The OECD (2007a) uses 
the term ‘unintended transfers’, which also has a negative connotation, but, in contrast 
to the term overcompensation, seems to put the blame more strongly on policy makers 
for not using public funds efficiently. 
The costs of participation are the farmers’ net costs (i.e. balance of revenue and costs 
changes) from implementing the measures, and have in the literature also been termed 
‘compliance  costs’  (Figure 2).  The  OECD  (2007a)  in  this  context  uses  the  term 
‘intended transfers’, which is identical to the costs of participation under a first best 
policy. 
Figure 2:  Terminology 
Overcompensation arises whenever some producers receive 
       higher transfers than necessary to cover their costs of participation
Alternative terms
Farm economics:
Welfare Economics:
OECD (2007):
profit / income / gross margin
producer surplus
unintended transfers
Compliance costs (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2007):
"landholders' true costs of service provision"
Intended transfers (OECD 2007):
"the minimal level of transfers to agricultural producers needed 
to produce the desired outcome, and only those transfers"  
Indicators commonly used to measure the performance of a policy in this context are 
the overcompensation rate (e.g. Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2007) and the targeting 
rate (OECD, 2007a): 
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3.1.2  Increase of budgetary efficiency 
In the case of the rural development measures, the most visible, though not necessarily 
main, part of the budget is resulting from the payments made to participating farmers. However, economic analyses increasingly raise the issue of transaction costs arising 
from implementation of policies (e.g. ITAES; OECD 2007a). This aspect is of specific 
relevance  also  for  this  study,  as  differentiated  payments  may  in  many  cases  entail 
increased  administrative  efforts,  the  costs  of  which  should  also  be  reflected  in 
budgetary considerations.
5 
Budget is thus defined as the sum of transfers and administrative costs 
  budget = transfers + administrative costs 
Whereas budgetary efficiency generally is defined as budget expenditure in relation to 
achieved results (e.g. Euro spent per kg N abated), in our case, as we compare polices 
with the same result (see above), the indicator reduces to  
   
budget
budget
    efficiency budgetary 
A policy 
policy B
policy B =  
with policy A being our reference policy, i.e. the undifferentiated flat-rate payment. 
3.1.3  Increase of economic cost-effectiveness 
For the analysis of the impact of differentiated approaches for determining payment 
levels of rural development measures on welfare, the following components of welfare 
changes are taken into account in this study: 
·  deadweight losses (welfare triangles): this study focuses on deadweight losses on 
the production side, as we assume that the changes to payment levels of the rural 
development measures do not have any impacts on prices 
·  policy-related  transaction  costs  (PRTCs):  the  costs  of  setting-up,  maintaining, 
changing  and  implementing  policies  (e.g.  information  gathering,  planning, 
monitoring) for the administration as well as for the farmers (OECD, 2007a) 
·  external effects: this study assumes that external effects are limited to the intended 
provision of societal benefits from farmers’ programme participation 
Deadweight  losses  and  PRTCs  are  part  of  the  resource  costs  to  society  (OECD, 
2007a). Whereas economic cost-effectiveness generally is defined as resource costs in 
relation to achieved results (e.g. resource costs per kg N abated), in our case, as we 
compare polices with the same result (see above), the indicator reduces to  
   
costs   resource
costs   resource
    ess effectiven - cost   economic
A policy 
policy B
policy B   =  
3.1.4  The  OECD  framework  for  evaluating  implementation  costs  of  agricultural 
policies 
The  performance  and  relative  ranking  of  differentiated  policies  is  likely  to  differ 
depending on the objective pursued. Simultaneously taking into account the different 
views raises the usual problems faced in applied multi-objective decision making, e.g. 
questions of acceptability  of trade-offs or appropriate weighting.  The  OECD in its 
work on implementation costs of agricultural policies (OECD, 2007a) has focused on 
                                                 
5 In practice, faced with continuous slashing of administrative resources, administrations seem to weigh 
an increase in administrative costs much higher than a corresponding increase of overall budgetary 
efficiency. the two objectives of minimizing resource costs and limiting unintended transfers. In 
the graphical representation of the problem (Figure 3), resource costs are represented 
on the X-Axis and unintended transfers on the Y-Axis. Whereas some policies can be 
unambiguously  identified  as  either  inferior  (Policy  B)  or  superior  (Policy  A),  we 
cannot say whether any policy falling in the grey areas is inferior or superior to the 
reference policy (Policy O). When the choice is indeterminate, policy makers might 
want to weigh the two types of costs. The OECD suggests, in the absence of any 
plausible alternative, to assume that a dollar of welfare gain is equivalent to a dollar of 
transfer, whoever is affected. This would split the diagram along the dotted line, with 
policies located below the line being evaluated as ‘superior’ to the reference policy. 
Interestingly, for our case of payments made for the provision of public goods, and 
under the assumption that PRTCs arise for the administration only (and are zero for 
farmers), applying identical weights to the objectives of economic cost-effectiveness 
and reduction of unintended transfers results in the same ranking of polices as does 
evaluating by budgetary efficiency. 
Figure 3:  Graphical  illustration  of  the  impact  of  resource  costs  and  unintended 
transfers for policy evaluation 
Source: Modified, based on OECD (2007a), Annex I.3 
With respect to the design of payments for rural development measures, there is scope 
to  argue  that  the  objective  of  limiting  unintended  transfers  has  a  high  political 
relevance, as failure to do so might infringe WTO requirements and may endanger the 
provision of these measures in the longer run. The degree of attention paid to aspects 
of  payment  calculation  in  the  EU  framework  regulation  for  rural  development 
programmes is evident to this hypothesis. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis has been 
carried out for the empirical examples to identify the effect of a higher weighting of 
the objective of limiting unintended transfers. 
weight 
1:1 3.2  Measures analysed 
This case study is embedded into the EU research project AGRIGRID, which seeks to 
develop methodological grids for the calculation of payment levels in selected rural 
development measures. On the basis of a literature review and expert interviews in 
ministries  and  related  institutions,  all  project  partners  generated  a  fairly  detailed 
summary  report  on  actual  methods  of  payment  calculations  encompassing  selected 
rural  development  measures  (Hrabalova  et  al.,  2007).  On  the  basis  of  this  report, 
several  stylised  examples  are  developed,  reflecting  selected  voluntary  rural 
development measures.  
In Germany, a large number of agri-environmental measures are offered by the various 
German Laender (Hartmann et al., 2006). The majority of measures are offered region-
wide,  particularly  those  measures  which  are  focused  on  agricultural  production 
processes, while measures focussing on nature protection are often targeted to specific 
designated areas. We can differentiate between 
·  measures  which  affect  the  whole  farm  (e.g.  organic  farming,  environmentally 
sound application of farm manure) 
·  measures which affect single enterprises (e.g. extensification of total pasture and 
meadow area, renunciation of herbicides on arable land, crop rotation diversity, 
conservation/buffer strips on arable land), and  
·  measures  which  target  specific  production  activities  (e.g.  mulch/direct  drilling, 
biological  plant  protection  in  fruit  growing,  cropping  with  underseeds  in 
vineyards).  
In addition, for our analysis it is helpful to distinguish between measures which  
·  do  not  (or  only  to  a  small  extent)  affect  yields  or  revenues,  and  for  which 
compliance costs result mainly from additional machinery, labour and/or seed costs 
(e.g. environmentally sound application of farm manure, soil analyses, cropping of 
intercrops).  Generally,  variances  of  compliance  costs  are  comparatively  small 
between participating farms for these measures. 
·  do affect yields or revenues, and for which compliance costs are to a large extent 
determined  by  a  change  in  yields  resulting  from  programme  participation  (e.g. 
conservation/buffer strips on arable land, conversion of arable land to extensively 
used  permanent  grassland,  restrictions  on  agro-chemical  inputs).  For  these 
measures,  compliance  costs  largely  depend  on  yield  levels  realised  before 
participation. 
Since variances in revenues are generally larger than variances in costs incurred by 
participation, this investigation focuses on variances in revenues. For the quantitative 
analysis, we developed stylised examples which reflect key characteristics of many 
existing measures influencing the potential and performance of differentiated payment 
schemes.  Regarding  the  impact  of  agri-environmental  measures  on  revenues,  the 
stylised examples distinguish two cases: 
·  For  measures  targeting  specific  production  activities,  many  of  the  payment 
calculations  assume  a  reduction  of  revenues  as  a  consequence  of  participation. 
Generally,  in  the  calculation  of  agri-environmental  payments  affecting  crop 
production this reduction is assumed to depend on yield levels (Hrabalova et. al, 
2007), which implies that compliance costs will strongly vary depending on the 
yield level realised before participation. We have selected wheat and potato yields as indicators of the level of participation costs for measures focussing on arable 
extensification  (e.g.  renunciation  of  growth  inhibitors  in  cereal  production; 
renunciation of synthetic plant protection in potato growing; conservation strips on 
cereal area). Wheat is the most important cereal in Germany, and potatoes have 
been chosen as an example for a crop with high yield differences between farms. 
·  For  agri-environmental  measures  affecting  all  arable  land  (e.g.  renunciation  of 
synthetic fertilisers and plant protection products; flower strips on arable land), 
many of the payment calculations for German  agri-environmental measures are 
based  on  the  Standard  Gross  Margin  (SGM)  of  an  average  crop  rotation.  We 
therefore analysed the impact of differences in the SGM of farm individual crop 
rotations. 
Generally,  yields  cannot  be  observed  on  a  farm  individual  level  at  reasonable 
administrative costs. Crop rotational information might be more readily available from 
the Integrated Administrative Control System (IACS). However, payment levels need 
to be calculated on a historical (i.e. pre-participation) basis, which would be difficult 
for farms which already participated in agri-environmental schemes in the past.
6 The 
challenge thus lies in approximating these indicators using available data from regional 
statistics or observable, time-invariant farm characteristics. 
A crucial point for the analysis is the identification of the link between (ecological) 
benefits and participation costs. Outcome-based measures are almost non-existent in 
agri-environmental programmes in the EU, and action-related measures predominate. 
Depending  on  the  specific  measure,  benefits  per  unit  of  land  enrolled  in  the 
programme  may  more  or  less  depend  on  individual  farm  characteristics.  Very  few 
studies  exist  which  provide  quantitative  information  on  the  benefits  or  ecological 
effectiveness  of  rural  development  measures  depending  on  farm  characteristics. 
Benefits will almost always depend on environmental states of the individual farms as 
well  as  of  the  total  region  before  the  implementation  of  agri-environmental 
programmes and targeting is essential. For this study, we assume that measures are 
targeted and focus on the issue of tailoring.
7 In the simplest case, each unit of land 
brought into the programme provides the same societal benefit. This relationship is 
also implied by the flat-rate per-ha payments of EU agri-environmental measures, and 
could be a plausible assumption for measures aiming to provide landscape elements 
like flower strips in a homogenous region. However, often, benefits may increase with 
the  production  intensity  of  participating  farms  and  thus  in  many  cases  with 
participation costs
8, e.g. for measures aiming to reduce nitrate leaching.  
Therefore,  in  this  study  all  analyses  have  been  carried  out  for  two  different 
assumptions on the link between (ecological) benefits and farm characteristics: 
                                                 
6 In addition, this could induce an incentive to ‘distort’ rotations if farms plan to enter new measures. 
7 The OECD (2007b) distinguishes ‘targeted policies’, which aim at specific outcomes, populations or 
areas, and ‘tailored policies’ which provides transfers no greater than necessary. For this study, we 
assume measures are targeted and focus on the issue of tailoring. 
8 Though there may be cases where (initial) contribution may be higher for participation of extensive 
farms, e.g. for measures aiming at increased biodiversity as some rare species are exclusively connected 
to extensive land. E1:  Each  unit  of  land  brought  into  the  programme  provides  the  same  benefit 
(reflecting, e.g., the impact of agri-environmental measures like flower strips in 
a homogenous landscape) 
E2:  Benefits  of  programme  participation  are  linearly  linked  to  the  level  of 
participation costs (reflecting, e.g., the impact of agri-environmental measures 
requiring a reduction of production intensity, as effects on nutrient balances or 
biodiversity will depend on production intensity before participation) 
As  a  reference,  payment  levels  are  calculated  on  basis  of  a  simple  standard  cost 
approach, i.e. the payment level equals (assumed) average participation costs within 
one federal state of Germany, reflecting current practice. This reference payment level 
thus  provides  a  financial  incentive  for  approximately  50%  of  the  eligible  area. 
Analysed differentiated standard cost approaches comprise 
A)  payment levels determined on lower administrative or geographical levels, i.e. the 
payment levels equal (assumed) average participation costs orientated on average 
revenues within 
  A1) regions defined on NUTS II level 
  A2) regions defined on county / rural district level (NUTS III) 
B)  payment  levels  determined  on  individual  farm  level.  For  a  farm  individual 
differentiation,  an  indicator  is  needed  which  serves  as  a  proxy  for  costs  of 
participation and is easily accessible (i.e. observable at low costs). In Germany, 
an example for such an indicator is the LVZ (landwirtschaftliche Vergleichszahl 
‘agricultural comparison figure’), which relates to yield potentials based on soil 
indices  with  some  corrections  for  location  and  climate.  The  LVZ  is  easily 
available for each farm as it is the basis of the agricultural tax system, and it is an 
accepted indicator for payment differentiation and has in the past already been 
used in some regions as basis for differentiation of less favoured area payments. 
The stylised examples assume that the hypothetical measures offered require farmers 
to comply with the specified obligations on one hectare of their arable land. Depending 
on the type of measure, participation costs depend on the revenues of a) one ha of 
wheat production, b) one hectare of potato production, or c) one hectare of arable land 
which is part of a typical crop rotation (all crops considered are substituted according 
to their corresponding ratio within the crop rotation). 
3.3  Data 
The  analysis  is  based  on  information  from  the  German  Farm  Accountancy  Data 
Network  (FADN),  which  covers  approximately  11 000  farm  accounts.  Data  is 
available on a yearly basis, however the sample is an unbalanced, rotating panel, and 
on  average  8 %  of  the  sample  farms  are  replaced  each  year.  To  avoid  yearly 
fluctuations  of  variables  to  distort  results,  the  analyses  focus  on  5-year  averages, 
matching the contract period of many rural development measures. For this analysis, 
data refers to the years 2001-2005, and only farms present in the sample in all five 
years have been included. Since there might be an impact on analysed variables, farms 
have  been  excluded  which  do  already  participate  in  respective  rural  development 
measures. With the exception of organic farming, there is no code in the FADN which 
allows  to  identify  participation  in  specific  rural  development  measures.  However, 
hardly any measures for extensification affecting arable cropping were offered in the 
case-study regions in the corresponding period, and for the few measures available, participation rates were low. Therefore, we excluded only organic and in-conversion 
farms from the sample, and assume that remaining farms are non-participants in agri-
environmental measures for arable land. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the sample data and the detail of differentiation. For the 
reference, payment levels are determined based on average values for all sample farms 
within  a  single  federal  state,  as  this  is  the  administrative  level  on  which  rural 
development programmes are designed in Germany. The descriptive analysis of the 
empirical  data  already  indicates  that  both  the  regional  and  the  farm  individual 
approach  to  payment  calculation  may  be  limited  in  their  scope  to  improve  on  the 
simple standard cost approach: 
·  While there are differences in regional average yields, yield variances within the 
sub-regions remain large. As an example, Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of 
wheat yields of the sample farms in Bavaria.  
·  The correlation coefficients between yields or SGM of crop rotation and the soil-
climate indicator for yield potential (LVZ) range from 0.2 (potato yields in North- 
Rhine-Westphalia)  to  0.6  (wheat  yields  in  Lower  Saxony).  Reasons  for  the 
comparatively  low  correlation  coefficients  are  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  LVZ  is 
based on estimations from the 1930s, and while soil qualities may be assumed to 
be  rather  constant,  technical  progress,  new  crop  variants  and  possibly  climate 
change seem to have reduced correlation of LVZ and  yields. In addition, yield 
levels  are  influenced  by  farm  manager  abilities  and  economic  considerations 
(maximum  yield  generally  is  not  equal  to  optimum  yield),  which  reduces  the 
correlation between yields and LVZ. 
Table 2: Sample data and the detail of differentiation 
Federal 
state 
NUTS II 
regions 
NUTS III 
regions 
revenue depending on  number of farms 
Bavaria  7  66  wheat yield 
potato yield 
SGM of crop rotation 
934 
254 
1475 
Lower 
Saxony 
4  28  wheat yield 
potato yield 
SGM of crop rotation 
472 
209 
1080 
North- 
Rhine- 
Westphalia 
4  34  wheat yield 
potato yield 
SGM of crop rotation 
512 
75 
773 
 
Few information on administration costs of environmentally measures exists, and the 
empirical studies highlight a large variation between measures and regions (OECD, 
2007a).  For  this  study,  we  calculated  all  examples  with  zero  and  with  additional 
administration costs amounting to 3% of transfers, and in addition calculated break-
even  points,  that  is  the  level  of  administration  costs  above  which  differentiation 
becomes unfavourable. Figure 4:  Distribution  of  wheat  yields  (average  2001-2005)  in  sample  farms  in 
Bavaria 
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4.  Results 
In the following sections, the performance of payment differentiation is presented with 
a view to the single objectives identified above, encompassing a sensitivity analysis 
with respect to the level of administration costs. Subsequently, trade-offs between the 
reduction of unintended transfers and economic cost-effectiveness are illustrated by 
applying the framework of the OECD, highlighting the impact of assigning different 
weights to the objectives as wells as of different levels of administration costs. 4.1  Impact of differentiated payment levels on overcompensation, budget and 
economic efficiency 
Based on the results (Table 3, Annex) the following tendencies can be formulated with 
respect to the performances of differentiated payments: 
·  The rate of overcompensation is reduced in almost all cases. Exceptions occur in 
some instances for the farm individual differentiation, which is a consequence of 
the comparatively low correlation of the proxy used for participation costs and true 
yield levels. Generally, the extent of the reduction of overcompensation is often 
limited also for the regional differentiation, as the variances of participation costs 
are high even within small regions. The best performances are observed for the 
differentiation  of  payment  levels  on  NUTS  III  level,  with  reductions  of  the 
overcompensation  rate  by  up  to  11%  in  the  case  of  measures  targeting  potato 
growing  in  North-Rhine-Westphalia  and  measures  targeting  the  complete  crop 
rotation in Lower Saxony. 
·  If  additional  administrative  costs  of  differentiated  approaches  are  negligible, 
budgetary  expenditures  can  be  reduced  in  the  majority  of  cases,  particularly  if 
ecological benefits rise with participation costs.  
·  Resource  costs  increase,  especially  if  ecological  benefits  are  assumed  to  be 
constant per ha of land contracted. In many cases, differentiation on NUTS III 
level significantly reduces economic cost-efficiency. 
·  In  case  differentiation  causes  additional  PRTCs,  performance  is  significantly 
reduced.  Budgetary  effectiveness is improved by  differentiation of payments in 
only two cases if assumed additional PRTCs amount to 3% of transfers. 
4.2  Performance  of  differentiated  payment  levels  with  a  view  to  unintended 
transfers and economic cost-effectiveness 
The  following  section  investigates  the  performance  of  policies  with  differentiated 
payment  levels  on  resource  costs  and  unintended  transfers,  using  the  graphical 
illustration  of  the  OECD  framework  to  highlight  the  trade-off  between  the  two 
objectives.  
Figure  5  provides  an  overview  of  the  performance  of  differentiated  payments  in 
relation to flat-rate payments of a hypothetical agri-environmental measure for wheat 
areas in Lower Saxony (excluding additional PRTCs).  
·  For  this  example,  in  general  all  variants  of  payment  differentiation  reduce 
unintended transfers at higher resource costs, and without weighting the considered 
objectives  no  clear  ranking  of  policies  can  be  established.  This  becomes 
specifically evident for payment differentiations at NUTS III level, where transfers 
are often significantly reduced while involving the highest resource costs, which 
can be observed also for most of the other case-studies. 
·  Weighting  both  objectives  equally  highlights  the  potential  of  differentiation, 
particularly if ecological benefits increase with participation costs. Three out of the 
five differentiated approaches perform better than the flat-rate policy.  
·  Allocating  a  higher  weight  to  the  objective  of  reducing  unintended  transfers 
(weighting ratio of 2:1) improves the performance of all differentiation approaches 
in comparison to a flat-rate policy.  Figure 5:  Unintended  transfers  and  resource  costs  for  different  approaches  to 
payment differentiation, for an agri-environmental measure targeting wheat 
areas in Lower Saxony 
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While  this  example  highlights  some  important  tendencies,  the  performance  of 
differentiation often depends on region and measure characteristics: 
·  For measures targeting potato areas, the performance of differentiated approaches 
is often poor, as variances in farm individual yields are poorly captured by regional 
classification or the soil-climate index. Assigning both objectives equal weights, 
differentiation  is  evaluated  inferior  to  a  flat-rate  policy  in  more  than  half  of 
respective cases.  
·  In  one  quarter  of  all  considered  cases  even  a  2:1  weighting  in  favour  of  the 
objective ‘reducing unintended transfers’ does not lead to a favourable evaluation 
of differentiated approaches. This becomes specifically evident for a differentiation 
on farm and NUTS II levels. Unfavourable evaluations are predominantly observed 
for measures targeting potato areas (5 cases). 
The  level  of  additional  administrative  costs  incurred  by  the  implementation  of 
differentiated  policies  proves  to  be  crucial  for  the  evaluation  of  the  performance 
(Table 4). We calculated the maximum level of administrative costs (as a percentage of 
total transfers) at which a payment differentiation is still superior to a flat-rate policy. 
In several cases, differentiated payments are already inferior to flat-rate payments even 
if no PRTCs are considered. In most cases with a 1:1 weighting of objectives, PRTCs 
for measures targeting wheat or potato areas have to be lower than 1 % of transfers for 
differentiated approaches to be recommendable. For measures targeting crop rotations, 
administration costs can often be higher (4-5%). 
Higher PRTCs for the implementation of differentiated approaches can be accepted if a 
weighting  ratio  of  2:1  on  unintended  transfers  versus  resource  costs  is  applied. 
Particularly for differentiations on NUTS III level, PRTCs may amount to up to 18% 
of transfers and still be superior to a flat-rate policy.  5.  Conclusions 
Preliminary results show that though overcompensation can be reduced by payment 
differentiation in most cases, savings in budget expenditures are often small and are 
even  offset  by  increasing  PRTCs.  The  evaluation  of  the  overall  performance  of 
payment differentiation strongly depends on the weights attached to the objective of 
reducing  unintended  transfers.  Generally,  the  scope  for  effective  and  efficient 
differentiation  depends  on  specific  measure  characteristics.  Potential  benefits  of 
differentiated approaches are higher if 
·  variances of participation costs in the universe of farms are high 
·  discriminatory nature of differentiation is significant 
-  for  regional  differentiation,  differences  between  subregions  need  to  be  high 
while variances within sub regions should be low 
-  for  farm  individual  differentiation,  the  correlation  between  actual  farm 
individual  costs  of  participation  and  selected  indicators  for  payment 
determination must be high 
·  correlation between costs of participation and environmental benefits are strong 
·  administration costs for differentiation approaches are low 
For  considered  hypothetical  agri-environmental  measures  it  has  been  assumed  that 
measure participation is causing participation costs to all farmers. However, there are 
specific  measures,  for  example  ‘diversifications  of  crop  rotations’  or  ‘extensive 
grassland usage’ where some farmers already respect measure requirements and do not 
face any adaptation costs but obtain pure windfall profits. In the following research 
period it is planned to extend our analysis to respective measures. Further, it is planned 
to  analyse  a  hypothetical  agri-environmental  measure  with  nonlinear  correlations 
between  yield  and  ecological  benefits  as  relevant  for  many  nature  conservation 
measures. Incorporating theses aspects might change outcomes considerably. 
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Table 3:  Impact of differentiated payment levels on overcompensation, budget and 
economic efficiency 
Differentiation
level
Wheat Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.8 101.2 102.4 104.2 105.8
NUTS III level 98.3 99.7 101.4 102.7 104.7
Farm level 100.2 100.4 100.1 103.4 103.5
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.8 99.3 100.5 102.3 103.8
Farm level 100.3 99.9 99.7 a) 102.9 103.0
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.6 100.2 101.7 103.2 105.2
NUTS III level 96.6 99.5 103.0 102.5 106.5
Farm level 97.4 101.1 103.8 104.2 107.3
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.7 98.8 100.1 101.8 103.5
Farm level 97.4 98.0 100.5 100.9 103.9
Bavaria Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.0 99.4 101.5 102.4 104.9
NUTS III level 96.5 99.8 103.4 102.8 106.9
Farm level 97.8 99.7 101.9 102.7 105.3
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.0 97.9 99.8 a) 100.8 103.2
Farm level 97.9 98.0 100.1 100.9 103.5
Potatoes Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 97.6 105.0 107.6 108.1 111.8
NUTS III level 89.0 106.2 119.2 109.3 123.5
Farm level 99.1 99.6 100.5 102.6 104.5
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 95.3 98.5 103.4 101.5 107.3
Farm level 99.1 99.6 100.5 102.6 104.5
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.0 98.7 100.8 101.7 104.7
NUTS III level 90.5 99.1 109.5 102.0 113.4
Farm level 99.9 100.9 100.9 103.9 104.9
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 98.0 98.7 100.8 101.7 104.7
Farm level 99.7 100.6 100.9 103.7 104.9
Bavaria Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 96.8 101.4 104.8 104.4 108.8
NUTS III level 90.6 101.0 111.6 104.1 115.5
Farm level 99.9 101.4 101.5 104.4 105.5
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 96.3 96.3 100.0 99.2 103.8
Farm level 100.2 100.0 99.8 a) 103.0 103.8
a) Less than 100 % due to integer number of contracts.
North-
Rhine-
Westphalia
Lower
Saxony
North-
Rhine-
Westphalia
Lower
Saxony
effectiveness effectiveness effectiveness
flat-rate = 100 % flat-rate = 100 %
Including additional PRTC's
Measure
application
in federal
Rate of over Budgetary cost Economic cost Budgetary cost Economic cost
compensation effectiveness
 
continued on next page Table 3 (continued): Impact of differentiated payment levels on overcompensation, 
budget and economic efficiency  
Differentiation
level
Crop Equal benefits per ha
rotation NUTS II level 99.9 109.6 109.8 112.9 113.9
NUTS III level 90.3 97.2 107.6 100.1 111.3
Farm level 95.4 95.5 100.1 98.4 103.7
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 95.5 95.6 100.0 98.4 103.6
Farm level 95.5 95.3 99.9 a) 98.2 103.5
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 94.8 95.2 100.4 98.1 104.3
NUTS III level 88.8 92.9 104.6 95.7 108.4
Farm level 99.1 99.1 100.0 102.1 104.1
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 94.6 94.7 100.1 97.5 103.9
Farm level 99.0 99.0 100.0 101.9 104.0
Bavaria Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level 101.4 101.8 100.4 104.9 104.1
NUTS III level 95.3 97.6 102.5 100.6 106.0
Farm level 99.8 99.8 100.0 102.8 103.6
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level 101.2 101.1 99.9 a) 104.1 103.5
Farm level 99.8 99.8 100.0 102.8 103.6
a) Less than 100 % due to integer number of contracts.
flat-rate = 100 %
Economic cost
effectiveness
Lower
Saxony
Measure
application
in federal
North-
Rhine-
Westphalia
flat-rate = 100 %
Rate of over
compensation
Budgetary cost
Including additional PRTC's
effectiveness
Economic cost
effectiveness
Budgetary cost
effectiveness
 Table 4: Trade-offs between objectives ‘reducing unintended transfers’ and ‘reducing 
resource costs’ with different weightings and PRTCs 
Differentiation level
without weighting Weighting 1:1 Weighting 2:1 Weighting 1:1 Weighting 2:1
Wheat
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate inferior inferior - -
NUTS III level indeterminate superior superior 0.3 1.9
Farm level inferior inferior inferior - -
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 0.7 1.9
Farm level indeterminate inferior inferior - -
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate inferior superior - 1.0
NUTS III level indeterminate superior superior 0.5 3.6
Farm level indeterminate inferior superior - 1.1
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 1.2 2.5
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 2.1 4.6
Bavaria Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 0.6 2.5
NUTS III level indeterminate superior superior 0.2 3.4
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 0.3 2.3
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level superior superior superior 2.2 4.2
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 2.1 4.2
Potatoes
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate inferior inferior - -
NUTS III level indeterminate inferior superior - 2.0
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 0.4 1.3
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 1.5 5.6
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 0.4 1.3
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 1.3 3.2
NUTS III level indeterminate superior superior 1.0 9.2
Farm level inferior inferior inferior - -
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 1.3 3.2
Farm level indeterminate inferior inferior - -
Bavaria Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate inferior superior - 0.9
NUTS III level indeterminate inferior superior - 6.7
Farm level inferior inferior inferior - -
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level superior superior superior 3.9 7.8
Farm level indeterminate inferior inferior - -
North-
Rhine-
Westphalia
Lower 
Saxony
North-
Rhine-
Westphalia
Lower 
Saxony
Measure
appliction 
in federal
state
Level of PRTC at
break-even point
% of transfers
Evaluation
with no additional
PRTC's
 
 
continued on next page Table 4 (continued): Trade-offs between objectives ‘reducing unintended transfers’ 
and ‘reducing resource costs’ with different weightings and PRTCs 
Differentiation level
without weighting Weighting 1:1 Weighting 2:1 Weighting 1:1 Weighting 2:1
Crop rotation
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level inferior inferior inferior - -
NUTS III level indeterminate superior superior 2.9 12.0
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 4.7 9.5
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 4.6 9.3
Farm level superior superior superior 4.9 9.7
Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 5.0 10.4
NUTS III level indeterminate superior superior 7.6 18.9
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 0.9 1.9
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate superior superior 5.7 11.3
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 1.0 2.1
Bavaria Equal benefits per ha
NUTS II level inferior inferior inferior - -
NUTS III level indeterminate superior superior 2.4 6.9
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 0.2 0.4
Varying benefits per ha
NUTS II level indeterminate inferior inferior - -
Farm level indeterminate superior superior 0.2 0.4
Measure
appliction 
in federal
state
North-
Rhine-
Westphalia
Lower 
Saxony
Level of PRTC at
break-even point
% of transfers
Evaluation
with no additional
PRTC's
 